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ABSTRACT
We investigate the impact of U.S. bombing on later economic development in Vietnam. The
Vietnam War featured the most intense bombing campaign in military history and had massive
humanitarian costs. We use a unique U.S. military dataset containing bombing intensity at the district
level (N=584). We compare the heavily bombed districts to other districts controlling for baseline
demographic  characteristics  and  district  geographic  factors,  and  use  an  instrumental  variable
approach exploiting distance to the 17th parallel demilitarized zone. U.S. bombing does not have a
robust negative impact on poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, literacy or population
density through 2002. This finding suggests that local recovery from war damage can be rapid under














The horrors inflicted by war are clear to all, and so are its disruptive effects for people’s lives. Indeed, war 
displaces population, destroys capital and infrastructure, disrupts schooling, and can produce negative 
environmental impacts, damage the social fabric, endanger civil liberties, and create health and famine 
crises. Any of these effects could be argued to have impacts on later economic growth and development, 
and their combined effects even more. Jean Drèze for one forcefully expresses the view that “[w]ars or 
rather militarism is the major obstacle to development in the contemporary world” (Drèze 2000: 1171). 
Yet the net long run effects of war are unclear a priori from the point of view of theory. In 
particular, standard neoclassical growth theory yields ambiguous predictions regarding the effect of war 
on long-run economic performance. To the extent that the main impact of war is the destruction of 
existing physical capital and temporary reduction of human capital accumulation, neoclassical models 
predict rapid postwar catch-up growth as the economy converges back to its steady state growth rate, 
resulting in no long-run impact. At the same time, war may also profoundly affect the quality of 
institutions, technology, and social outcomes. These institutional effects of war may in turn have negative 
or positive impacts on long-run economic performance. For instance, it is often argued that military 
research and development lead to faster technological progress, which may offset war damage. Wars may 
also promote state formation and nation building as was the case in Europe (Tilly 1975), and may induce 
social progress via greater popular participation. For instance, political enfranchisement historically has 
often been a byproduct of war (Keyssar 2000), and this may in turn enhance public goods provision. 
The long run economic impacts of war remain largely unexplored empirically, and this is so for 
several reasons. One important issue is the difficulty of convincingly identifying war impacts on 
economic growth in the presence of dual causality between violence and economic conditions, and 
possible omitted variable biases (see Miguel et al 2004 for a related discussion). But a perhaps even more 
fundamental constraint for empirical work is the lack of data on war damage and economic conditions in 
conflict (and post-conflict) societies. We exploit a uniquely data-rich historical episode to estimate the   2
impact of war on long-run economic performance, the U.S. bombing of Vietnam (what Vietnamese call 
“the American War”).  
The Indochina War, centered in Vietnam, was the most intense episode of aerial bombing in 
human history (Clodfelter 1995):  
“The United States Air Force dropped in Indochina, from 1964 to August 15, 1973, a total of 
6,162,000 tons of bombs and other ordnance. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft expended 
another 1,500,000 tons in Southeast Asia. This tonnage far exceeded that expended in World War 
II and in the Korean War. The U.S. Air Force consumed 2,150,000 tons of munitions in World 
War II – 1,613,000 tons in the European Theater and 537,000 tons in the Pacific Theater – and 
454,000 tons in the Korean War.” 
 
Vietnam War bombing thus represented at least three times as much (by weight) as both European and 
Pacific theater World War II bombing combined, and about fifteen times total tonnage in the Korean War. 
Given the prewar Vietnamese population of approximately 32 million, U.S. bombing translates into 
hundreds of kilograms of explosives per capita during the conflict. For another comparison, the atomic 
bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had the power of roughly 15,000 and 20,000 tons of TNT, 
respectively (Grolier 1995). Since general purpose bombs – by far the most common type of bomb used 
in Vietnam and in our dataset – are approximately 50% explosive material by weight, each atomic bomb 
translates into roughly 30,000 to 40,000 tons of such munitions. Measured this way, U.S. bombing in 
Indochina represents 100 times the combined impact of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs.  
This study employs an unusual United States military district-level dataset on bombs, missiles, 
rockets and other ordnance dropped in Vietnam. The U.S. bombing of Vietnam was largely concentrated 
in a subset of regions: roughly 70% of all ordnance was dropped in only 10% of the 584 districts in the 
sample. Figure 1 shows the geographic location of the 10% most heavily attacked districts, in terms of 
total U.S. bombs, missiles and rockets per km
2. 
The heaviest bombing took place in Quang Tri province in the central region of the country near 
the 17
th parallel, the former border between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Quang Tri province was 
basically bombed flat during the war, with most of its capital and infrastructure destroyed: only 11 of 
3,500 Quang Tri villages were left unbombed by the end of the war (Project RENEW Report 2004: 3).   3
Provinces immediately north and south of Quang Tri also received heavy U.S. bombing, although less 
than Quang Tri itself. Coastal regions of North Vietnam and some districts of Hanoi were heavily 
bombed, as was the so-called “Iron Triangle”, the region adjacent to Cambodia near Saigon in the South. 
This region was the site of frequent incursions by North Vietnamese troops and Vietcong/NLF guerrillas 
into South Vietnam through the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail that ran from North Vietnam through Laos 
and Cambodia. 
There are many reasons to think U.S. bombing could have long-run impacts on Vietnamese 
economic development. We focus on three factors in particular in the empirical analysis. First, the 
destruction of local infrastructure may have inhibited commerce and possibly changed later investment 
patterns. For instance, U.S. bombing during the Rolling Thunder campaign of the late 1960s “destroyed 
65 percent of the North's oil storage capacity, 59 percent of its power plants, 55 percent of its major 
bridges” (Clodfelter 1995: 134).
1 Second, U.S. bombing displaced population, and this could potentially 
have reduced local economic activity if many individuals never returned home. Third, population 
displacement and the destruction of physical infrastructure – including classrooms – disrupted schooling 
for millions of Vietnamese. In terms of other possible factors, we do not have complete information on 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), landmines or U.S. Agent Orange use, and unfortunately cannot focus on 
these in the main empirical analysis (however, there is obviously a strong correlation between bombing 
and later UXO density).
2 
In this paper, we use the extensive variation in U.S. bombing intensity across 584 Vietnamese 
districts to estimate long-run local impacts of the war. In our main finding, we find no robust adverse 
impacts of U.S. bombing on poverty rates, consumption levels, electricity infrastructure, literacy, or 
                                                 
1 See Tilford (1991: 155) for further details on the extent of U.S. bombing damage. 
2 UXOs as well as landmines can impair the use of agricultural land, and are expensive to find and remove. While 
UXOs and landmines can seriously hurt farming families when an income earner is victimized, overall UXO and 
landmine injury rates in Vietnam during the 1980s and 1990s declined rapidly relative to the immediate postwar 
years (Project RENEW report 2004: 16-18). The chemical agents used by the U.S. could also generate long term 
damage to population health and the environment. The best known, Agent Orange, is a defoliant containing dioxins, 
and as late as 2001 traces of TCDD, the dioxin specific to Agent Orange, were still found in human blood in some 
areas. Deforestation itself could also negatively affect the environment and agriculture by increasing soil instability 
and affecting wildlife.   4
population density through 2002. If anything, the more heavily bombed districts may have slightly less 
poverty than other districts. These results are consistent across a variety of specifications and samples. 
There is suggestive evidence of a moderate negative effect of U.S. bombing on consumption levels in 
1992/1993, but also evidence for a positive effect on consumption growth between 1992/1993 and 2002, 
suggesting that there may have been negative war impacts on average local living standards but that these 
dissipated over time as a result of rapid catch-up growth. While the precise mechanisms underlying this 
result remain elusive, there is suggestive evidence that extra state investment in heavily bombed regions 
played a role in the recovery. To be absolutely clear, the human welfare costs of the war in Vietnam – 
which led to millions of civilian deaths by all accounts – were massive even if there are no detectable 
long-run local economic growth impacts. 
The key econometric identification issue is the non-random nature of U.S. bombing patterns. If 
regions with unobservably better economic growth prospects were more (or less) likely to be heavily 
bombed, this could bias estimated bombing impacts. Understanding the sources of variation in U.S. 
bombing is thus critical. In this regard, the identification strategy benefits from at least two factors. First, 
the most heavily bombed areas were those located near the 17
th parallel north latitude, the border between 
North and South Vietnam during the war. This arbitrarily drawn border, set by the 1954 Geneva Accords 
that ended French colonialism in Indochina, became a locus for heavy fighting during the war, and its 
placement at 17
 degrees, rather than 16 or 18 degrees, can be viewed as a natural experiment. The border 
was not drawn by Vietnamese, but was instead the outcome of fierce negotiations among the major world 
powers, including the United States and Soviet Union, in the context of the Cold War. The United States 
sought to push the border farther north, the Soviet Union farther south. We use the north-south distance 
from a district to the 17
th parallel as an instrumental variable for U.S. bombing intensity in our preferred 
empirical specification, exploiting this source of variation. 
The second main concentration of heavy U.S. bombing lies in areas where the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
entered South Vietnam. While not as clearly exogenous as the North Vietnam-South Vietnam border, the 
outlets of the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam reflected, to a large extent, geographical conditions   5
along the South Vietnam-Cambodia border rather than local socioeconomic conditions within Vietnam. 
At its main southern outlet, there was less mountainous terrain than is the case farther north along the 
border, facilitating troop movements into the Mekong Delta flatlands. 
To further address omitted variable bias concerns, we perform regressions focusing only on areas 
in Vietnam’s central and southern region that were largely rural and at broadly similar levels of economic 
development in the early 1960s before the war. The analysis also includes baseline 1960 population 
density and geographic and climatic characteristics as regression controls, as well as province fixed 
effects in some specifications. Finally, we argue below that any remaining bias due to the non-random 
placement of U.S. bombs is likely to lead to a spurious negative correlation between bombing intensity 
and later living standards, probably strengthening our main findings. 
It is important to note an important limitation up front. While this econometric strategy provides 
estimates of differences across districts, the approach is unable to capture any aggregate nation-wide 
effects of the war on subsequent Vietnamese development. The counterfactual – Vietnamese economic 
performance in the absence of “the American War” – cannot be observed or estimated. This is potentially 
important to the extent that the war led to major national institutional and social changes, or if the cross-
region spillovers of the war within Vietnam were large. Still the rapid rate of economic growth in 
Vietnam since the early 1990s – at 6% on average between 1993 and 2003 (World Bank 2004) – suggests 
that any nation-wide impacts on long-run growth rates were not strongly negative. 
The within-country empirical approach also has merits, however. We exploit the common data 
sources and postwar institutions and policies across Vietnamese regions, allowing us to pinpoint 
persistent local economic impacts of bombing more precisely than would be possible in a cross-country 
analysis, where controlling for national trends and institutions would be problematic. 
In related work, Davis and Weinstein (2002) show that the U.S. bombing of major Japanese cities 
during World War II had no long run impact on the population of those cities relative to prewar levels, 
and Brakman et al. (2004) find a similar result for postwar Germany. Organski and Kugler (1977, 1980) 
find that the economic effects of the two world wars on a sample of mainly European countries tended to   6
dissipate after only 15-20 years, for both capitalist and socialist economies, after which there was 
typically a return to prewar growth trends. Przeworski et al. (2000) similarly find that postwar economic 
recovery is rapid in a cross-country empirical analysis. 
We view our results as complementary to these earlier studies. We are able to measure the long 
run impact of bombing on a larger set of outcomes than other studies, which either only focus on 
population effects or on aggregate macroeconomic effects. Indeed, we look at the effect of bombing on (i) 
variables that are central to understanding economic performance – physical capital, human capital and 
population – and on (ii) other variables that relate directly to human welfare, including poverty rates and 
consumption. We are thus able to paint a more complete picture of the long run impacts of war. 
In terms of other differences with existing studies, note that Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s 
was much poorer than either Japan or Germany and was an overwhelmingly rural country. The urban 
agglomeration effects emphasized by some theories thus likely played a less important role in postwar 
recovery patterns in Vietnam than elsewhere. Another major difference between postwar Vietnam and 
Japan is that the former was a centrally planned economy while the latter was a market economy. This 
raises the question of what general lessons we can learn from these empirical results, since other countries 
with different institutions might have reacted differently than either Japan or Vietnam. Since institutions 
are often quite country specific, in our view it is through the accumulation of evidence across many 
settings that researchers can best begin to create a convincing picture of war’s economic effects. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the predictions of growth 
theory regarding the long run effect of war on economic performance. Section 3 presents the data. Section 
4 discusses determinants of U.S. bombing, the main empirical analysis is presented in section 5, Section 6 
elaborates on the underlying mechanisms, and the final section discusses broader lessons. 
 
2. War and the Theory of Economic Growth 
In order to provide perspectives on war’s possible economic impacts, it is useful to recall the results from 
the standard Ramsey growth model. If war leads to the partial destruction of the physical capital stock and   7
the production function remains unchanged, there will be a temporary increase in capital acccumulation 
until the steady state is reached again. In other words, war has no long run effects on the economy but 
leads to a transitory increase in investment and in consumption growth relative to a situation without war. 
If war leads to a loss of the capital stock in some areas but not in other areas, the former will experience 
temporarily higher investment and consumption growth. If capital is mobile, capital will also flow to the 
war-damaged areas so as to equalize the marginal return to capital across regions.  
Postwar recovery patterns are qualitatively similar for human capital (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
2003 for a full treatment of the two-sector growth model). A reduction in human capital levels in a war 
torn region will also result in more rapid postwar accumulation of human capital there, though again there 
will be no change in steady state outcomes provided that other model parameters are unchanged.  
The effects of a loss of capital stock in a growth model with vintage capital are somewhat 
different. To the extent that the postwar investment consists of more recent and better quality capital, 
economic performance could eventually exceed that of the prewar economy and similarly, regions that 
suffered more from the war might eventually overtake regions that suffered less. Gilchrist and Williams 
(2004) indeed argue that a vintage capital growth model is more consistent with macroeconomic recovery 
patterns in postwar Japan and Germany than the standard neoclassical model. Our main empirical 
findings appear to be consistent with both the neoclassical growth and vintage capital views, and we do 
not attempt to decisively distinguish between these two models below. 
Another reason why the steady state of the economy may be affected by the loss of capital 
through war is the possibility of falling into a poverty trap (Azariadis and Drazen 1990, World Bank 
2003). Given its low initial income level and the extensive U.S. bombing, if a war induced “poverty trap” 
would ever be possible Vietnam would be a good candidate. Empirically we find no evidence suggesting 
a poverty trap at either the local or national levels in Vietnam. 
  Beyond the loss of physical and human capital, war could however also lead to institutional 
changes that would affect the aggregate production function, by modifying its scale parameter.   
Deterioration in institutions would thus lead to a new steady state characterized by a lower long run level   8
of both capital and consumption. By symmetry, positive institutional changes brought about by war lead 
to higher steady state capital and consumption postwar. However, institutional changes could go in either 
direction and theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction as to the effect of war on institutions. 
The possibility of cross-regional spillovers is also important to the extent that economic 
conditions in one region affect growth elsewhere. Central government taxation and transfers may benefit 
some regions more than others. In the empirical analysis below, we explore the possibility of cross-
district spillovers by examining relationships at different levels of aggregation (namely, at the provincial 
and district levels), and also examine postwar state investment patterns to establish whether the areas 
most affected by the war benefited from additional investment. 
 
3. The Data 
We use a database assembled by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) housed at the United 
States National Archives in Record Group 218, called “Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff”.
3 The 
database contains information on all ordnance dropped from U.S. and allied airplanes and helicopters in 
Vietnam between 1965 and 1975, as well as artillery fired from naval ships and sea mines dropped.
4 To 
our knowledge, these files embody the most complete, comprehensive and reliable summary available of 
U.S. and allied air and sea ordnance expended during the Vietnam War. Some of the original tape 
archives were reportedly damaged so up to several months of data may be missing, but unfortunately we 
are unable to determine the precise extent of any missing data. The data were originally recovered from 
aircraft mission logs and then reported to U.S. Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were 
declassified in 1975 and provided to the Vietnamese government following the war. The Data Appendix 
discusses data sources in greater detail. 
                                                 
3 We obtained the data from the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) with authorization from DSCA 
and the Vietnam Ministry of Defense Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal. 
4 In particular, data come from the 1965-70 Combat Activities-Air (CACTA), the 1970-1975 South East Asia 
(SEADAB), and Combat Naval Gunfire (CONGA) databases.    9
The raw data include the bombing location, a summary bomb damage assessment (which we 
unfortunately do not have access to, since this would be useful in the analysis), and the quantity of 
ordnance by category and type. Categories include general purpose bombs, cluster bombs, chemicals, 
incendiary, rockets, missiles, projectiles, ammunition, mines and flares. Ordnance are measured in units 
rather than by weight. Since the source of the data is the U.S. Air Force and Navy, we miss anti-personnel 
landmines that were placed by Army ground forces, which probably accounts for a large share of U.S. 
landmines, and the landmine data are thus much less reliable than the other data. The raw ordnance data 
were then geo-coded by VVAF using Vietnam district boundaries employed in the 1999 Population and 
Housing Census to yield the dataset used in the analysis. (Examples of the raw bombing data are 
presented in Appendix Figures 1 and 2.) 
General purpose bombs are by far the most common ordnance category (Table 1). The Mark 82 
and Mark 36 Destructor general purpose bombs typically weighed between 500 to 750 pounds. Average 
bombing intensity is high, with an average of 32.3 bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 nationwide 
through the war, and there is extensive variation across districts for all ordnance categories. The 
distribution of bombs was skewed, with 10% of districts receiving nearly 70% of all bombs, missiles and 
rockets
5, and some districts receiving over 500 bombs per km
2. The most intense attacks took place near 
the 17
th parallel that formed the border between North and South Vietnam during the war. 
We focus at times in the analysis on what we call the “Central Region” of the country, which as 
we define it includes 22 provinces and 229 districts straddling the 17
th parallel, and includes nearly all 
districts in the top 10% most bombed group. This Central Region excludes the major cities of Da Nang, 
Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City), Hanoi, and Haiphong as well as both the extreme north of the country 
bordering China and the southern Mekong Delta region.
6 Bombing intensity in the Central Region is 
                                                 
5 Quang Tri district in Quang Tri province, which is only 6 km
2 in size, actually received over 3000 bombs per km
2, 
the highest in the dataset by far. We exclude this outlier in the analysis below while still using data from the rest of 
Quang Tri province.  
6 The provinces in the Central Region are (current names): Ba Ria, Binh Dinh, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, Binh 
Thuan, Dak Lak, Dong Nai, Gia Lai, Ha Tinh, Khanh Hoa, Kon Tum, Lam Dong, Nghe An, Ninh Thuan, Phu Yen, 
Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri, Tay Ninh, Thanh Hoa, and Thuathien-Hue.    10
nearly double that for the nation as a whole and there is also considerably more variation in bombing 
there. It was overwhelmingly rural at baseline since cities are excluded, making it a particularly useful 
region to focus on in the analysis since there is far less baseline socioeconomic variation there than for the 
country as a whole. Comparing heavily bombed areas only to other nearby districts also located within the 
Central Region sample can be viewed as a form of matching estimation. 
Figure 2 presents the geographic distribution of bombing intensity in Vietnam in greater detail. 
The poor northwestern region of Vietnam was hardly bombed at all, in part because of the Johnson 
administration’s reluctance to antagonize China by bombing near its borders (Tilford 1991: 153). While 
bombing intensity was highest near the 17
th parallel, it was also high in the “Iron Triangle” region of 
South Vietnam adjacent to Cambodia, the endpoint of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as well as in some parts of 
North Vietnam, as discussed above. 
There is a positive and statistically significant correlation across all ordnance categories dropped 
in a district (Table 1). In the regression analysis below, we mostly employ total intensity of bombs, 
missiles, and rockets per km
2, but given the substantial correlation with other ordnance categories (e.g. 
ammunition), this is also a good proxy for the overall intensity of local war activity. Unfortunately, we do 
not have comparable data for ordnance used by the North Vietnamese Army or Vietcong/NLF nor do we 
have ordnance damage measures. Although we do not have disaggregated data on Agent Orange 
exposure, the broad regional patterns of Agent Orange exposure correspond closely with bombing 
intensity, as can be seen by comparing the maps in Stellman et al (2003) with Figure 2 here. 
We obtained provincial population density in 1960-61 from both South Vietnam and North 
Vietnam government sources (described in the Data Appendix) and use those data as baseline controls in 
the main regressions (Table 2). A variety of local geographic and climatic characteristics – including 
proportion of land at high altitude, average district temperature and precipitation, location in former South 
Vietnam, and the proportion of land in 18 different soil type categories – are also included as district 
explanatory variables in most specifications in order to control, at least in part, for agricultural 
productivity and factors potentially affecting military operations (e.g., altitude). The soil type controls are   11
excluded from the province level analysis due to limited degrees of freedom, as there are only 55 
provinces in the final province sample. 
We focus on several economic outcomes. Poverty rate estimates are from Minot et al. (2003), 
who use the Elbers et al (2003) local regression method. This approach matches up 1999 Population and 
Housing Census data – which has excellent geographic coverage but limited household characteristics – 
with detailed 1997/8 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) household data. Log-linear regressions of 
real cost-of-living-adjusted per capita consumption expenditures on the 17 household characteristics 
found in both the census and VLSS are then carried out, and the regression results used to compute 
predicted household consumption (details of the procedure are in the Data Appendix). The poverty rate is 
defined as the proportion of district population estimated to be living on less than 1,789,871 Vietnamese 
Dong per year, the official 1999 national poverty line, and approximately 41% of the national population 
met this criterion (Table 2). The 1999 census also provides detailed information on household access to 
electricity (71% of households nationwide have electricity) and literacy (88% of respondents), our main 
proxies for past physical and human capital investments, respectively. 
We obtained per capita consumption expenditure data from both the 1992/3 and 2002 VLSS 
waves for a sample of households in a subset of 166 districts, reducing the sample. We focus on province 
level averages when using the VLSS, since the data was designed to be representative at this level of 
aggregation. These data allows us to assess consumption levels and growth during the rapid economic 
expansion of the 1990s. The VLSS also contains useful retrospective information on migration patterns 
that we explore below. 
Finally, Vietnamese Statistical Yearbooks provide a consistent series on province population for 
1985 to 2000, and some information on central government investment flows for 1985 data that we utilize 
in the analysis below. Unfortunately, more detailed economic data is lacking for the 1970s and 1980s, a 
period which constitutes a sort of statistical black hole. Recall that in the aftermath of the “American 
War”, Vietnam also fought a border war with China and occupied Cambodia to end Khmer Rouge rule, 
and data collection was a low priority for the regime while the country remained on a war footing.   12
 
4. Determinants of U.S. Bombing Intensity 
Before presenting the econometric analysis, we discuss the existing literature on U.S. bombing strategy 
during the Vietnam War. A distinction is often made between the nature of bombing in North Vietnam 
and South Vietnam. U.S. bombing in North Vietnam was largely considered strategic bombing, targeting 
transportation capabilities (e.g., airfields, railroads, bridges, ports, roads), as well as military barracks, 
industrial plants, and storage depots (Clodfelter 1995: 134). The selection of targets in North Vietnam 
was directly supervised by Washington officials on a weekly basis during the Johnson administration’s 
“Rolling Thunder” air campaign (Littauer et al., 1972: 37), and the number of approved targets regularly 
fell below the requests of the military, with the bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong and areas near the Chinese 
border categorically ruled out. A far broader set of targets in North Vietnam was approved under the 
Nixon administration’s “Linebacker” campaign, including targets in the North’s main population centers 
during the so-called “Christmas Bombing” of 1972. 
Bombing in South Vietnam, and in parts of North Vietnam near the border, in contrast, was 
typically interdiction bombing or tactical air support, which aimed to disrupt enemy troop movements and 
support U.S. ground troop operations, rather than explicitly to destroy infrastructure (Littauer et al 1972: 
55; Schlight 1988: 292). Below we present empirical results broken down by the former North and South 
Vietnam in some cases, in addition to the full sample estimates, to investigate any differential impacts. 
Some existing research suggests there was no robust correlation overall between local population density 
and bombing intensity (Nalty 2000: 83), but other authors claim that poorer areas were actually more 
likely to be hit by U.S. bombing: “[i]n the remoter, sparsely populated regions often used by the 
NLF/NVA [Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army] for staging, regroupment, and infiltration, area saturation 
bombing is common” (Littauer et al 1972: 10-11). 
Turning to the statistical analysis, the north-south distance from the 17
th parallel is a strong 
predictor of bombing intensity and is statistically significant in the province level analysis (Table 3, 
regression 1), district level analysis (regression 2), and a specification that excludes Quang Tri province,   13
the most heavily bombed province (regression 3), and is large and negative but only marginally 
significant when we restrict attention to the Central Region (regression 4). The main district level 
specification in regression 2 serves as the first stage regression for the subsequent IV-2SLS analysis. Note 
that the instrument is highly statistically significant with a t-statistic near three in that case. In all these 
specifications and those below, disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated (“clustered”) for districts 
within the same province, in case there are geographic, socioeconomic or political factors correlated 
among neighboring districts.
7 
A remaining econometric concern is whether the instrumental variable violates the exclusion 
restriction, in the sense that distance from the 17
th parallel has an independent impact on postwar 
outcomes beyond any effect working through bombing intensity (conditional on the control variables). 
One possible concern is that the IV is correlated with distance to one of Vietnam’s two major cities, 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. If remoteness from these two booming metropolitan areas is associated 
with lower incomes during the postwar period, as seems likely, this would generate a negative correlation 
between distance to the 17
th parallel and poverty in 1999. However, despite any such bias, below we find 
no significant relationship between U.S. bombing and later poverty in the IV specification, strengthening 
our main finding. In other words, despite the fact that districts near the 17
th parallel had the double 
misfortune of being heavily bombed and being far from major national markets, they are currently no 
poorer than other regions conditional on baseline and geographic characteristics. 
None of the other explanatory variables is significantly related to U.S. bombing intensity in a 
consistent way across the four specifications in Table 3, including the indicator for former South 
Vietnam, altitude measures, climatic conditions and latitude. The one partial exception is the prewar 
1960-61 province population density measure, which is negative and statistically significant across the 
three district level specifications, suggesting that more rural areas were somewhat more likely to be 
bombed, echoing some of the existing historical literature. However, note that this result does not hold in 
                                                 
7 The use of general spatially correlated disturbance terms, as in Conley (1999), leads to standard errors very similar 
to those produced by clustering districts by province throughout (results not shown).   14
the province level analysis in regression 1. Thus overall, with the exception of distance to the 17
th parallel 
(the instrumental variable), there are no consistent correlations between observables and bombing 
intensity, partially alleviating omitted variable bias concerns. 
 
5. The Long-run Impact of Bombing Vietnam 
5.1 Impacts on Poverty and Consumption Expenditures 
We consider local bombing impacts at both the province and district levels. There are a number of reasons 
to consider outcomes at different levels of aggregation. First, U.S. bombing of one district could generate 
negative externalities for other nearby districts. Provincial level regressions are one way to partially 
capture these externalities, although this specification still misses broader cross-province externalities. 
Second, the main baseline 1960-61 population density control is at the province level, and thus when 
population density is the dependent variable at least (in Section 5.3 below), the analysis utilizes a true 
panel design. Finally, the province results serve as a robustness check for the district level analysis. 
Total U.S. bombing intensity is negatively and marginally statistically significantly related to the 
1999 poverty rate at both the province level (Table 4, regression 1) and the district level (regression 2). 
The district level relationship between bombing intensity and poverty is presented graphically in Figure 3. 
The main empirical results are similar if we consider only the intensity of general purpose bombs, the 
major ordnance category, or if we consider a log transformation of total bombing intensity (not shown). In 
terms of other factors, areas that had higher population density in 1960-61 have significantly less poverty 
in 1999 as expected, as does South Vietnam as a whole on average, while higher altitude areas have 
considerably higher poverty rates (regressions 1 and 2). Climatic factors and latitude, in contrast, are not 
robustly associated with poverty, although high precipitation districts have significantly more poverty in 
some specifications. 
The district level effect remains negative and is even more statistically significant in 
specifications that include province fixed effects (Table 4, regression 3) and exclude Quang Tri 
(regression 4), but is not statistically significant if attention is restricted to the Central Region sample   15
(regression 5). Overall, the OLS specifications provide suggestive evidence that U.S. bombing moderately 
reduced later poverty, but estimates are only marginally significant and not particularly robust. This 
negative relationship may in part reflect the fact that some of the poorest provinces in Vietnam, those in 
the northwest, were rarely bombed by the U.S. due to their proximity to China, potentially generating a 
spurious correlation. More generally, some other unobserved source of socioeconomic variation could be 
driving both the observed bombing patterns and later poverty rates. We thus next turn to estimates that 
rely on the placement of the North Vietnam-South Vietnam border at the 17
th parallel as exogenous 
variation in bombing intensity. In the reduced form specification (Table 4, regression 6), the north-south 
distance from the 17
th parallel is negative but not statistically significantly related to 1999 poverty, 
conditional on all other province and district geographic factors. Using this distance as an instrumental 
variable for U.S. bombing intensity in our preferred specification, we find that the relationship between 
bombing intensity is positive but not statistically significant (Table 4, regression 7): the coefficient 
estimate on total U.S. bombing intensity is 0.00026 (standard error 0.00042). 
To get an idea of the magnitude of this bombing impact on later poverty, first consider the effect 
of a change from zero bombing up to the average bombing intensity of 32.3 bombs, missiles, and rockets 
per km
2. The average effect in this sense is (32.3)*(0.00026) = 0.008. This is a very small average effect, 
an increase in the poverty rate by less than one percentage point and it is not statistically significant. In 
terms of how precise this estimate is, the 95% confidence interval ranges from 0.00026 – 2*0.00042 = -
0.00058, up to 0.00026 + 2*0.00042 = 0.0011. Thus again considering the effect of going from zero 
bombing up to the average intensity of 32.3, the 95% confidence band of estimates is (32.3)*(-0.00058) = 
-0.019 to (32.3)*(0.0011) = 0.035. In other words, plausible average effects range from a 1.9 percentage 
point reduction in poverty up to a 3.5 percentage point increase in poverty on a base poverty rate of 41%. 
This is a reasonably tight range of estimates. Carrying out the analogous exercise using the OLS estimate 
(Table 4, regression 2) yields a point estimate of (32.2)*(-0.00040) = -0.013, a 1.3 percentage point 
reduction in poverty (going from zero bombing up to average bombing intensity), and a 95% confidence   16
interval from -2.7 percentage point decrease in poverty up to +0.1 percentage point increase, again a 
narrow range of estimates around zero. 
We next present alternative specifications. The effect of bombing on poverty is negative and 
statistically significant in former North Vietnam (Table 5, regression 1) but not in former South Vietnam 
(regression 2,). The explanation for this North-South difference remains elusive. It might reflect a postwar 
central government bias towards assisting heavily bombed areas in the North  but the different nature of 
bombing across the two regions might also be part of the story. Bombing effects are not statistically 
significant in initially rural areas (districts with baseline 1960-1 population density less than 200 per km
2, 
regression 3) but are statistically significant and negative in urban areas (regression 4). There is some 
evidence for a nonlinear effect of bombing intensity on later poverty rates: the linear bombing term 
remains negative and statistically significant while the squared term is positive and significant (regression 
5). This pattern appears to in part reflect the high poverty rates in Quang Tri province, the most heavily 
bombed province in the country and may suggest that war impacts can be persistent for extremely intense 
bombing like that in Quang Tri, although that is speculative. Point estimates are however not statistically 
significant when an alternative nonlinear measure of high bombing intensity is used (regression 6). 
We next explore related relationships using the more detailed VLSS household consumption 
expenditure data. Average consumption per capita in 2002 is not robustly associated with bombing 
intensity across the full sample (Table 6, Panel A, regression 1), or in a specification that excludes Quang 
Tri province (regression 2), restricting attention to the Central Region (regression 3), or in a specification 
that includes the north-south distance to the 17
th parallel as the main explanatory variable (regression 4). 
In contrast, all four of these specifications indicate that more heavily bombed provinces were somewhat 
poorer in 1992/93 (Table 6, Panel B), although none of those effects are significant at traditional 
confidence levels. 
Taking the growth rate of per capita consumption expenditures as the dependent variable, we find 
that provinces that experienced more intense U.S. bombing had significantly faster growth between 
1992/93 and 2002 (Table 6, Panel C), and in three of the four specifications this effect is statistically   17
significant at over 95% confidence. The coefficient estimate from the full sample (regression 1) implies 
that going from zero to average U.S. bombing intensity is associated with (32.3)*(0.0030) or 10 
percentage points faster consumption expenditure growth during that ten year period, a substantial 
difference that works out to be roughly one percentage point faster growth per year on average. 
These patterns suggest that more heavily bombed areas were somewhat poorer than other areas 
after the war but they later caught up during the 1990s economic boom, in line with the neoclassical 
growth model’s prediction of especially rapid consumption growth along the transition path back to 
steady state. Unfortunately, due to data limitations we cannot trace out consumption growth patterns in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and so cannot estimate the extent of poverty in heavily bombed areas during the 
immediate postwar period. Nevertheless, by 2002, nearly thirty years after the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam, 
the provinces that bore the brunt of the U.S. assault are largely indistinguishable from other areas in terms 
of poverty and average living standards.
8 
  
5.2 Impacts on Infrastructure and Human Capital 
There is a positive relationship between U.S. bombing intensity and 1999 access to electricity across the 
standard set of province and district specifications (Table 7, panel A), and coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant at 95% confidence in six of these seven specifications. The relationship is weaker 
when province fixed effects are included as controls (regression 3), but the point estimate on U.S. 
bombing remains positive and marginally statistically significant even in that case. Note the negative and 
significant coefficient estimate on north-south distance to the 17
th parallel, suggesting particularly 
intensive power sector investments near the former border. 
                                                 
8 We examined attained adult height as recorded in the VLSS database as a measure of living standards for cohorts 
born before and during the war to gauge the extent to which living standards fell in heavily bombed areas.  We do 
find that the average height of the 1961-70 and 1971-80 birth cohorts is significantly lower in more heavily bombed 
regions. However, it is also somewhat smaller for earlier cohorts born pre-1961 in those same areas. The largest 
coefficient estimate on U.S. bombing intensity (for the 1961-70 cohort) is -0.0165, implying an average reduction of 
0.5 cm when going from zero to average U.S. bombing intensity – not a large effect.  The relatively small sample 
sizes in the VLSS, especially when broken down by year of birth, gender, and province cells, and the possibility that 
children across a wide range of ages could experience some growth stunting due to the war, prevent us from drawing 
any strong conclusions. The possibility of differential child and infant mortality as a result of the war could generate 
selection effects that would further complicate interpretation.   18
Taken together these estimates provide some suggestive evidence in favor of technological 
“leapfrogging” in the heavily bombed regions, consistent with a vintage capital growth model, or possibly 
investments in the heavily bombed regions that far exceeded war damage. Speculatively, this may have 
been a political reward for regions that actively resisted the U.S. during the war. However, given the 
limited immediate postwar data, we have little hope of determining the relative contributions of these two 
distinct explanations. Infrastructure investment decisions in Vietnam in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s likely 
reflected a combination of central government redistributive goals as well as potential private investment 
returns, especially in the aftermath of the economic reforms, and it is difficult to disentangle these 
motives in the absence of detailed district-level public and private investment data, which we do not have. 
International donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even the U.S. government (following 
the normalization of Vietnam-U.S. relations in 1995), also played increasingly important roles in funding 
reconstruction projects during this period, further complicating interpretation. 
Another factor in the neoclassical growth model is human capital. There is no statistically 
significant negative impact of bombing on either province or district literacy rates in 1999, an important 
proxy for human capital investments (Table 7, Panel B, regressions 1-7), and similarly weak results hold 
for a variety of other 1990s human capital measures from the VLSS database as well as for 1985 school 
enrollment per capita from the government yearbooks (results not shown). 
Thus taking these results together, there is no evidence that more heavily bombed districts have 
either less physical infrastructure or human capital stocks 25 years after the end of the war, consistent 
with the rapid postwar recovery in consumption levels documented above. This is not to say that the war 
left no observable marks in heavily bombed regions. For one thing, more heavily bombed provinces have 
higher membership in war veterans’ associations – in a specification analogous to Table 6 regression 1, 
the point estimate is 0.00022, standard error 0.00011 – and there is suggestive, though not always 
significant, evidence that 2002 disability rates are also somewhat higher there (regressions not shown), 
perhaps in part due to war and landmine/UXO injuries. 
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5.3 Impacts on Population Density 
Total U.S. bombing intensity is not significantly related to province population density in 1999 (Table 8, 
regression 1), with a point estimate of 0.13 and standard error 0.49. Provinces that had high population 
density in 1960-61 also tend to have high density in 1999 (the point estimate on 1960-61 density is 0.89, 
standard error 0.19) as expected, and former South Vietnam has somewhat higher 1999 population 
density than former North Vietnam overall, although that difference is only marginally significant. In this 
province level specification, the effect of a change from zero U.S. bombing up to average province level 
bombing intensity is (30.6)*(0.13) = 4.0 additional people per km
2, a miniscule effect with a tight 95% 
confidence range from -26 to +34 people per km
2, less than 0.1 of a standard deviation in 1999 province 
population density. 
In a variety of district level OLS specifications, total U.S. bombing intensity is not statistically 
significantly related to 1999 district population density (Table 8, regression 2-5). Similarly, in neither the 
reduced form regression of population density on the north-south distance from the 17
th parallel 
(regression 6), nor the IV-2SLS specification (regression 7) is the key explanatory variable statistically 
significantly related to 1999 district population density. However, one caveat to all of the district level 
population results are the large standard errors on the key coefficient estimates, which make these 
estimates far less precise than the poverty results reported above (in Tables 4 and 5). The leading 
explanation for these large standard errors in the district level regressions is the absence of a prewar 
district level population density control: province population density in 1960-61 is only weakly correlated 
with 1999 district population density, in sharp contrast to the precisely estimated province level results 
(Table 8, regression 1). 
There is similarly no statistically significant effect of U.S. bombing intensity on 1999 district 
population density in a variety of other samples and specifications, including in former North Vietnam 
and South Vietnam, in rural areas (districts with baseline 1960-1 population density less than 200 per 
km
2), when province fixed effects are included, and using alternative measures of bombing intensity   20
(regressions not shown). The estimated effect of bombing is positive for urban areas in some 
specifications but the result is not robust (regressions not shown). 
We next trace out effects on population density over time from 1985 to 2000. Using data from 
Vietnamese Statistical Yearbooks, we find no effect of bombing intensity on population density in 1985 
(Table 9, Panel A). We also find no effects on province population density growth rates from 1985 to 
2000 (Panel B). So unlike for consumption, there is no evidence of population “catch-up” growth. 
Moreover, as was the case for 1999 population, there is no statistically significant effect of U.S. bombing 
on province population density in any year from 1985 to 2000 (results not shown). This suggests that if 
there were any population movements into the more heavily bombed regions after the war, they must 
have occurred prior to 1985. Unfortunately, disaggregated population figures, as well as other official 
demographic and economic measures, are incomplete for the postwar 1970s and early 1980s, preventing 
us from extending this analysis back to the immediate postwar period. Thus it remains possible that there 
were in fact short run local war effects on population that had dissipated by the mid 1980s. 
It is theoretically possible that this lack of postwar population density effects is due to large 
postwar inflows of migrants into the heavily bombed districts, but while we cannot rule this out, nor do 
we find any compelling evidence that this is in fact the case. Using the 1997/8 VLSS data, U.S. bombing 
intensity does not have a robust statistically significant effect on the proportion of individuals not born in 
their current village of residence (Table 9, Panel C), although the point estimate is positive and marginally 
statistically significant in one specification (excluding Quang Tri province, regression 2). 
 
6. Why No Long-run Local Impact? 
Why does the most intense bombing campaign in human history seemingly have no adverse local 
economic consequences 25 years later? There are a variety of explanations, based on our empirical 
analysis as well as our reading of the historical literature. First, much U.S. bombing targeted South 
Vietnam with the purpose of impeding the progress of enemy troops (both North Vietnamese Army and 
Vietcong/NLF guerrillas) and took place in rural areas (Tilford 1991: 105-6). These areas had little fixed   21
infrastructure to destroy, and instead bombing often led to the destruction of forest and farmland, much of 
which could be expected to recover naturally over time. Even U.S. military planners recognized early in 
the war that “the agrarian nature of the [Vietnamese] economy precludes an economic collapse as a result 
of the bombing” (Pentagon Papers 1972: 232).  
The North Vietnamese also employed a variety of ingenious strategies to limit the damage to the 
physical infrastructure that did exist. First of all, some industrial operations were dispersed across 
multiple sites (Kamps 2001: 70). Second, according to Tilford (1991: 112) “[r]oads (such as they were) 
were quickly repaired. Bridges were bombed often but, in addition to being difficult to hit, were easily 
bypassed with dirt fords, underwater bridges, and pontoon bridges.” In North Vietnam up to half a million 
people worked full time during the conflict rebuilding infrastructure destroyed by U.S. bombing (Herring 
2002: 176). 
There was also a major Vietnamese government reconstruction effort after the war, with massive 
mobilization of labor and resources to rebuild damaged infrastructure and de-mine the countryside (World 
Bank 2002). Although we lack district-level investment data for the postwar period, Vietnamese 
government yearbooks contain information on total state investment by province during the period 1976-
1985. For 1985 alone we are able to construct per capita state investment figures (complete province 
population data is only available to us for 1985), and we find that provinces that were more heavily 
bombed during the war did in fact receive somewhat greater postwar state investments (in millions of 
1985 Dong per capita): in a specification analogous to Table 6, column 1, the point estimate on total U.S. 
bombing intensity is 0.0113 (standard error 0.0071, regression not shown), and this effect is nearly 
statistically significant at 90% confidence. This is a large effect: going from zero to average province 
level bombing intensity leads to an increase of 1.5 standard deviations in per capita investment. Similarly, 
over the entire period 1976-1985, the ratio of state investment flows for provinces above the median in 
terms of U.S. bombing relative to provinces below median bombing is 2.0. In other words, the more 
heavily bombed provinces received twice as much state investment as other provinces on average. As one 
can see in Figure 4, this ratio increases rapidly after 1980, with the end of armed conflict with China and   22
the complete occupation of Cambodia, suggesting that the reallocation of state investment across regions 
became stronger when more resources were available. These patterns provide further evidence that the 
Vietnamese government made significant efforts to allocate additional resources to the more heavily 
bombed regions. This may explain some of the gains in infrastructure and may have also laid the 
foundation for the rapid catch-up growth in consumption discussed above. 
In terms of population, the displacement caused by bombing seems to have been mostly 
temporary. Vietnamese communities developed elaborate responses to avoid injury during periods of 
intense U.S. bombing, including hiding for extended periods in well provisioned bomb shelters and in 
underground tunnels – thousands of miles of which were built during the war – while others fled 
temporarily before returning to rebuild (Herring 2002: 174-176). 
Finally, despite the war, large-scale school expansion and literacy campaigns were carried out 
during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in North Vietnam, where promoting literacy was a central social 
goal of the regime (Ngo 2004). Since school infrastructure was vulnerable to U.S. bombing, teachers and 
students dispersed into small groups to avoid strikes, and schools often had foxholes and helmets for 
students’ protection during U.S. attacks (Duiker 1995, Nguyen Khac Vien 1981). 
 
7. Conclusion 
We found no robust long run impacts of U.S. bombing on local poverty rates, consumption levels, or 
population density in Vietnam over 25 years after the end of the “American War”. If anything, the bulk of 
the empirical results point to moderate reductions in long-run poverty and somewhat better electricity 
access in the areas hit by more U.S. bombing, as well as faster consumption growth during the 1990s. 
Given that the bombing of Vietnam was the most intense episode of bombing in world history, this is 
perhaps a surprising result. There is evidence of substantial reallocation of Vietnamese government 
resources towards the regions that were more heavily bombed, and this can plausibly explain at least part 
of the absence of long run local impacts.   23
As discussed above, our econometric approach compares more heavily bombed areas to other 
areas and thus cannot estimate any nation-wide effects of the war on Vietnamese economic development. 
The counterfactual – national Vietnamese economic outcomes in the absence of war – is impossible to 
reconstruct. If the regions not greatly affected by the war assisted the more heavily bombed regions 
through postwar resource transfers, as our state investment data suggest, then differences between the 
more and less heavily bombed areas would be dampened but overall Vietnamese living standards could 
still have fallen. In that case, the actual aggregate effects of U.S. bombing on long run Vietnamese 
economic performance would be more negative than our estimates imply. Using the case of nearby 
Southeast Asian countries that did not suffer during the “American War” (e.g., Malaysia and Thailand) as 
a convenient counterfactual suggests that income levels in Vietnam could possibly be much higher today. 
On the other hand, the war undoubtedly fostered a strong sense of Vietnamese nationalism and 
accelerated the development of capable North Vietnamese institutions, and both of these effects may have 
contributed to faster postwar recovery. The legacy of the war has clearly not prevented Vietnam from 
achieving rapid economic growth: Vietnamese growth in GDP per capita has recently been among the 
fastest in the world, at 6% per year between 1993 and 2003 (World Bank 2004), following the reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Caution is called for, however, in drawing broader lessons regarding war’s impacts on economic 
growth in general. Whether U.S. bombing impacts would have been more persistent in Vietnam in the 
absence of this remarkable recent growth performance is an open question. Unlike many other poor 
countries, postwar Vietnam benefited from strong, centralized political institutions able to mobilize 
human and material resources in the reconstruction effort. Countries with successful postwar recovery 
experiences are also probably more likely to collect the sort of systematic economic data that make this 
study (as well as Davis and Weinstein 2002 and Brakman et al. 2004) possible. This may lead to a serious 
form of selection bias: countries where the economy and institutions have collapsed after wars (e.g., 
Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia) lack such data, preventing the estimation of any persistent 
local war impacts in those societies.   24
Vietnam also emerged successfully from war out of a long struggle for national liberation
9 against 
a series of foreign occupiers (first the French, then the Japanese briefly, and finally the United States), an 
experience that provided its postwar leaders considerable nationalist political legitimacy. In contrast, the 
bulk of wars in the world today are internal civil conflicts, which may exacerbate political and social 
divisions and weaken national institutions rather than strengthen them. Some recent research suggests that 
the low-level civil conflict in the Basque region of Spain has significantly reduced economic growth there 
relative to neighboring regions (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003), for example. Collins and Margo (2004) 
find that the physically destructive U.S. race riots of the 1960s had lingering effects on the average local 
income of African Americans up to twenty years later. The world’s most conflict prone region today is 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where state institutions are notoriously weak (Herbst 2000). In such a setting, 
postwar reconstruction may drag on far longer than in Vietnam (or in Japan, where postwar political 
institutions were also strong) leading to more persistent adverse legacies of war. Due to the uniqueness of 
each society’s institutions, politics, and history, in our view further empirical evidence accumulated 
across a variety of cases is needed before general claims about the effects of war on long run economic 
performance can be made. 
                                                 
9 The conflict in Vietnam was a combination of a war of national liberation and a civil conflict between the North 
and the South, but the political rhetoric of the victorious North usually emphasized the former.   25
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Figure 1: Map of Vietnam – 10% of districts with the highest total 
U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 shaded 
 
Hanoi / Haiphong region 
Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) region 
Quang Tri Province 
17
o North latitude    29
 
 
Figure 2: Map of Vietnam – Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 
(20 quantiles, darker colors denote higher intensity districts) 
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Figure 3: 1999 estimated district poverty rate vs. 
Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 in the district 
(conditional on 1960-61 province population density, South Vietnam indicator, district average 
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Figure 4: State investment 1976-1985, 






















































Table 1: Summary statistics – U.S. ordnance data 
           
 Mean  S.D.  Max.  Obs.  Correlation 
with general 
purpose bombs 
Panel A: District level data           
Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 32.3 68.5 561.5  584   
Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets  14692  37349  365449  584   
     General purpose bombs  11124  30779  322111  584  1 
     Cluster bombs  706  2268  32403  584  0.59
*** 
     Missiles  24.7  121.7  1600  584  0.27
*** 
     Rockets  2828  7208  106445  584  0.64
*** 
Cannon artillery  8.6  51.9 772  584  0.37
*** 
Incendiaries 795  16431  11667  584  0.65
*** 
White phosphorus  70.7  306.6  3580  584  0.27
*** 
Ammunition (000’s of rounds)  5677  11061  136416  584  0.54
*** 
          
Panel B: Province level data           
Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 30.6 51.7 335.5  55   
          
           
Notes: The summary statistics are not weighted by population.  The minimum value is zero for all variables at the district level, and thus we do not present this in 
the table. The sample throughout excludes Quang Tri district (one district within Quang Tri province), which has by far the highest total U.S. bombs, missiles, 
and rockets intensity per km
2, at 3148; this outlier is excluded from the analysis throughout. Significant at 90 (*), 95 (**), 99 (***) percent confidence.   33
 
Table 2: Summary statistics – economic, demographic, climatic, and geographic data 
           
 Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
Panel A:  District  level  data       
Estimated district poverty rate,  1999  0.41 0.20 0.03 0.94 584 
Population  density,  1999  1659  5846 10 2332  584 
Proportion of households with access to electricity, 1999  0.71 0.27 0.08 1 584 
Literacy  rate,  1999  0.88 0.11 0.24 0.99 584 
Proportion of land area 250-500m  0.11  0.19  0  1  584 
Proportion of land area 500-1000m  0.11  0.21  0  1  584 
Proportion of land area over 1000m  0.03  0.11  0  1  584 
Total district land area (km
2) 529  513  4  3230  584 
Average precipitation (cm)  154.6  30.1  84.2  282.0  584 
Average temperature (celsius)  24.3  1.9  19.4  27.3  584 
Former South Vietnam  0.49  0.50  0  1  584 
Latitude (
oN)  18.0 5.2  9.7 25.4 584 
| Latitude – 17
oN  |  4.9 2.0 0.0 8.4 584 
       
Panel B:  Province  level  data       
Population  density  (province),  1960-61  244 437  12 2868 55 
Population  density,  1985  401 533  34 3196 53 
Population  density,  1999  465 540  62 2908 55 
Change in population density, 1985-2000  77.7  154.5  -439.4  745.1  53 
Proportion not born in current village, 1997/98  0.26 0.23  0  1  55 
Per capita consumption expenditures, 1992/93 (in 1998 Dong)  1831  591  997  3546  55 
Per capita consumption expenditures, 2002 (in 1998 Dong)  3084  1007  2040  7505  55 
Growth in per capita consumption expenditures 1992/93-2002  0.74  0.38  -0.08  1.67  55 
Latitude (
oN)  17.6 5.4 10.0  25.2 55 
| Latitude – 17
oN  |  5.0 2.0 0.3 8.1 55 
       
           
Notes: The summary statistics are not weighted by population. District latitude is assessed at the district centroid, and province latitude is the average of the 
district latitudes, weighted by district land area. 
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Table 3: Predicting bombing intensity 
         
 Dependent  variable: 
Total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






































































































      
District soil controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  No  Yes  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 55  584  576  229 
R
2  0.54 0.33 0.25 0.43 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  30.6 (51.7)  32.3 (68.5)  27.1 (50.6)  56.7 (91.0) 
         
Notes: Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. 
Disturbance terms are clustered at the province level in regressions 2-4. The district soil type controls include the proportion of district land in 18 different soil 
categories. The omitted altitude category is 0-250m. 
 
The Central Region includes the following provinces: Ba Ria, Binh Dinh, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, Binh Thuan, Dak Lak, Dong Nai, Gia Lai, Ha Tinh, Khanh 
Hoa, Kon Tum, Lam Dong, Nghe An, Ninh Thuan, Phu Yen, Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri, Tay Ninh, Thanh Hoa, and Thuathien-Hue, and 
excludes Da Nang (City) and Ho Chi Minh (City).    35
 
Table 4: Local bombing impacts on estimated 1999 poverty rate 
   



























































































































































































| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
      -0.0044 
(0.0069) 
 
District  soil  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province  fixed  effects  No No Yes No No No No 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  55 584 584 576 229 584 584 
R
2  0.75 0.61 0.79 0.63 0.72 0.60  - 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  0.39 (0.16)  0.41 (0.20)  0.41 (0.20)  0.41 (0.20)  0.43 (0.20)  0.41 (0.20)  0.41 (0.20) 
               
                
Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. Disturbance terms are clustered at the 
province level in regressions 2-8. The district soil type controls include the proportion of district land in 18 different soil categories. The omitted altitude category 
is 0-250m. The instrumental variable in regression 7 is | Latitude – 17
oN |.  
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Table 5: Local bombing impacts on estimated 1999 poverty rate – alternative specifications 
             















All Vietnam  All Vietnam 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

























Top 10% districts, total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km
2 
 
      -0.030 
(0.026) 
District demographic, geographic, soil  controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  300 284 409 175 584 584 
R
2  0.70 0.66 0.60 0.65 0.62 0.60 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  0.46 (0.20)  0.35 (0.18)  0.46 (0.19)  0.29 (0.16)  0.41 (0.20)  0.41 (0.20) 
             
Notes: Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. 
Disturbance terms are clustered at the province level. District demographic and geographic controls include Population density (province) 1960-61, Former South 
Vietnam, Proportion of land area 250-500m, Proportion of land area 500-1000m, Proportion of land area over 1000m, Average precipitation (cm), Average 
temperature (celsius), and Latitude (
oN). The district soil type controls include the proportion of district land in 18 different soil categories. The omitted altitude 
category is 0-250m. 
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Table 6: Local war impacts on consumption expenditures and growth (VLSS data) 
         








      
Panel A: Dependent variable: 2002 per capita consumption expenditures          










| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
    3 . 3
 
(54.5) 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  Yes  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  55 54 20 55 
R
2 0.61  0.62  0.69  0.60 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  3084 (1007)  3092 (1014)  2898 (689)  3084 (1007) 
      
Panel B: Dependent variable: 1992/93 per capita consumption expenditures          










| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
    5 3 . 9
 
(48.1) 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  Yes  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  55 54 20 55 
R
2 0.46  0.44  0.59  0.47 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  1831 (591)  1847 (585)  1773 (583)  1831 (591) 
      
Panel C: Dependent variable: Growth in consumption, 1992/93-2002         












| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
    -0.057
** 
(0.028) 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  Yes  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  55 54 20 55 
R
2 0.47  0.41  0.56  0.41 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  0.74 (0.38)  0.72 (0.37)  0.73 (0.46)  0.74 (0.38) 
         
Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence.  All regressions contain controls for 
Population density (province) 1960-61, Former South Vietnam, Proportion of land area 250-500m, Proportion of land area 500-1000m, Proportion of land area 
over 1000m, Average precipitation (cm), Average temperature (celsius), and Latitude (
oN). The omitted altitude category is 0-250m.   38
 
Table 7: Local war impacts on infrastructure and human capital 















Panel A: Dependent variable: 
Proportion of households with access to electricity, 1999 
       
         




















| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 




District  soil  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province  fixed  effects  No No Yes No No No No 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  55  584 584 576 229 584 584 
R
2  0.59 0.57 0.75 0.57 0.62 0.58  - 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  0.72 (0.21)  0.71 (0.27)  0.71 (0.27)  0.71 (0.27)  0.67 (0.26)  0.71 (0.27)  0.71 (0.27) 
         
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
Proportion of literate respondents, 1999 
       
         
















| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
      - 0 . 0 0 7 0  
(0.0052) 
 
District  soil  controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province  fixed  effects  No No Yes No No No No 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Observations  55  584 584 576 229 584 584 
R
2  0.65 0.59 0.75 0.59 0.55 0.59  - 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  0.89 (0.07)  0.88 (0.11)  0.88 (0.11)  0.88 (0.11)  0.86 (0.11)  0.88 (0.11)  0.88 (0.11) 
               
Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. Disturbance terms are clustered at the 
province level in regressions 2-8. All regressions include Population density (province) 1960-61, Former South Vietnam, Proportion of land area 250-500m, 
Proportion of land area 500-1000m, Proportion of land area over 1000m, Average precipitation (cm), Average temperature (celsius), and Latitude (
oN). The 
district soil type controls include the proportion of district land in 18 different soil categories. The omitted altitude category is 0-250m. The instrumental variable 
in regression 7 is | Latitude – 17
oN |.   39
Table 8: Local bombing impacts on 1999 population density 
                 
  Dependent variable: Population density, 1999 



































































































































































| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
        237.1 
(328.6) 
 
District  soil  controls    No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province  fixed  effects    No No Yes No No No No 
Exclude  Quang  Tri  province    No No No Yes No No No 
Central  Region  sample    No No No No Yes No No 
Observations    55  584 584 576 229 584 584 
R
2    0.86 0.16 0.56 0.15 0.52 0.15  - 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable    465 (540)  1659 (5846)  1659 (5846)  1678 (5884)  406 (605)  1659 (5846)  1659 (5846) 
                 
                
Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. Disturbance terms are clustered at the 
province level in regressions 2-8. The district soil type controls include the proportion of district land in 18 different soil categories. The omitted altitude category 
is 0-250m. The instrumental variable in regression 7 is | Latitude – 17
oN |.  
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Table 9: Local war impacts on other population characteristics 
         








Panel A: Dependent variable: Population density, 1985         










| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
    -2.3 
(10.4) 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  Yes  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  53 52 20 53 
R
2  0.73 0.73 0.55 0.73 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  401 (533)  407 (536)  139 (72)  401 (533) 
      
Panel B: Dependent variable: Growth in population density, 1985 to 2000         










| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
    7.5 
(6.5) 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  Yes  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  53 52 20 53 
R
2  0.24 0.24 0.50 0.24 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  77.7 (154.5)  78.7 (155.8)  59.5 (84.0)  77.7 (154.5) 
      
Panel C: Dependent variable: 1997/98 proportion not born in current village         











| Latitude – 17
oN | 
 
    0.006 
(0.016) 
Exclude Quang Tri province  No  Yes  No  No 
Central Region sample  No  No  Yes  No 
Observations  55 54 21 55 
R
2  0.52 0.43 0.70 0.51 
Mean (s.d.) dependent variable  0.27 (0.23)  0.27 (0.23)  0.34 (0.30)  0.27 (0.23) 
         
Notes: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence.  All regressions contain controls for 
Population density (province) 1960-61, Former South Vietnam, Proportion of land area 250-500m, Proportion of land area 500-1000m, Proportion of land area 
over 1000m, Average precipitation (cm), Average temperature (celsius), and Latitude (
oN). The omitted altitude category is 0-250m. 
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Appendix Figure 1: Raw DSCA bombing data, Quang Binh province 
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Appendix Figure 2: Raw DSCA bombing data, Quang Tri province 




(1) U.S. Military data 
The bombing data in this paper are derived from the following files, housed at the National Archives in 
Record Group 218, “Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff”:  
Combat Activities File (CACTA) 
•  October 1965 – December 1970; November 1967 not available.  Monthly.  Derived from Combat 
Activities Reports II/III (COACT II/III), detailing daily air combat operations flown by the US 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Pacific Air Forces. Carter et al. (1976) list data cards for Army and 
USMC helicopters as primary input sources. 
Southeast Asia Database (SEADAB) 
•  January 1970 – June 1975.  Daily records of allied air combat activities flown by the US Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as the (South) Vietnamese Air Force, Royal Lao Air 
Force, and Khmer (Cambodian) Air Force.  Includes both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.   
Combat Naval Gunfire File (CONGA) 
•  March 1966 – January 1973.  Records of naval gunfire support in North and South Vietnam.   
 
To the best of our knowledge, these data cover all air combat operations flown by all allied forces 
involved in the Second Indochina War, including Thai and Australian.  Some of the original tape archives 
were damaged, so several months of data may be missing.   
The data are geocoded at the district level, employing the codes and boundaries used by the General 
Statistical Office in the 1999 Population and Housing census.  The air ordnance data are divided into 16 
categories by type: ammunition, cannon artillery, chemical, cluster bomb, flare, fuel air explosive, general 
purpose (iron bomb), grenade, incendiary, mine, missile, other, rocket, submunition, torpedo, and 
unknown.  All entries denote number of units, rather than weight, of ordnance expended by district.  
Nearly all entries denote single units; most ammunition-class entries denote thousands of units. The naval 
gunfire data are divided into approximately forty specific categories. 
Type of ordnance, quantity of ordnance, and drop location were originally recorded by the pilots and 
gunners who fired the weapons.  Such records were created every time ordnance was expended.  The data 
were reported to Pacific Command and ultimately the Joint Chiefs, who declassified the CACTA, 
SEADAB, CONGA files in 1975, after which they were sent to the National Archives.   
The data were provided by Tom Smith at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), in 
cooperation with Michael Sheinkman of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF).  We are 
indebted to Tom Smith, Michael Sheinkman, and Bill Shaw A01 (AW) USN (ret.) for their assistance in 
understanding the data. VVAF sought and obtained permission from the Technology Center for Bomb 
and Mine Disposal (BOMICO), a department of the Engineering Command of the Vietnam Ministry of 
Defense to provide us the data. 
  Clodfelter (1995: 216-7) summarizes U.S. ordnance: “Most bombs dropped by U.S. aircraft were 
either 750-pounders (favored by the U.S. Air Force) or 500-pounders (favored by the U.S. Navy), but 
bombs of up to 2,000 pounds and other ordnance of unconventional design and purpose were employed.  
Included among America’s air arsenal were antipersonnel bombs whose outer casing opened to release a 
string of small warheads along a line of one hundred yards.  Some of the other U.S. antipersonnel and 
high-explosive bombs were the Lazy Dog, which exploded thirty yards above the ground to release a steel 
sleet of hundreds of tiny darts; cluster bombs, which were ejected from large canisters by small explosive 
charges after they had penetrated the upper canopy of the forest; and Snake Eyes, which oscillated 
earthward under an umbrellalike apparatus that retarded the rate of fall long enough to allow the bombing 
aircraft to come in low with its bomb load and then escape the resulting effects of the detonation.” The 
following table provides more details.   44
 
Appendix Table 1: U.S. Ordnance Categories 
   
Ordnance category  Description 
 
General purpose bombs 
 
Conventional iron bombs, free-falling and unguided. “These account 
for the greatest fraction of the total weight of aerial munitions used; 
they are carried by fighter-bombers, attack bombers, and high-flying 
strategic bombers (B-52s), and delivered by free fall. ... Weight ranges 
from 100 pounds to 3000 pounds; most common range is 500-1000 
pounds; about 50 percent of weight is explosive. The bomb works 
mostly by blast effect, although shrapnel from the casing is also 
important. ... The crater from a 500-lb. bomb with impact fuze (e.g., 
MK 82) is typically 30 feet in diameter and 15 feet deep (this 
obviously varies greatly with the terrain). Shrapnel is important over a 
zone about 200 feet in diameter. Simple shelters (sandbags, 
earthworks, even bamboo) protect against all but close hits.” (Littauer 
et al 1972: 222). “The biggest of [the GP bombs] was the 15,000-
pound BLU-82B ‘Daisy Cutter’.” (Doleman 1984: 127) 
 
Cluster bombs  Cluster bomb units (CBUs) scatter the submunitions they contain—
ranging from under forty to over 600 in number—over a wide area, 
yielding a much broader destruction radius than conventional iron 
bombs. The outer casing is “blown open (by compressed gas) above 
ground level (typically 500-foot altitude), distributing bomblets over 
an area several hundred feet on a side.” (Littauer et al 1972: 222).  In 
our dataset these are primarily fragmentary general purpose, anti-
personnel, and anti-material weapons, and occasionally tear gas or 
smoke, ranging in total bomb weight from 150 to over 800 lbs. 
 
Missiles  Self-guided air-deployed munitions. Includes self-propelled air-to-air 
and air-to-ground missiles (that typically hone in on radiation from 
engines or radar) as well as free-fall “smart bombs” (guided toward 
their targets by laser reflection or electro-optical imaging, e.g., AGM-
62 “Walleye”). “The most important anti-radiation air-to-ground 
missiles used by the U.S. forces in Vietnam were the AGM-45 Shrike 
and AGM-78 Standard ARM. Radar-directed like the Sparrow, the 
Shrike was carried by navy and air force jets, including the Wild 
Weasels.  Its purpose was to knock out the ground radar stations that 
controlled the deadly SAMs and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns.” 
(Doleman 1984: 125). 
 
Rockets  Self-propelled unguided munitions. “The most common size is 2.75" 
diameter, delivered singly or in bursts from tubes mounted under the 
aircraft. Accuracy of delivery is generally higher than for free-fall 
weapons. Warheads include fragmentation (flechette), high explosive 
(including shaped charge against armored vehicles), and incendiary 
action (most white phosphorus or plasticized white phosphorus, PWP). 
Phosphorus may be used as anti-personnel weapon, but also serves to 
generate white smoke (often for target designation for further strikes).” 
(Littauer et al 1972: 223) 
   45
Cannon artillery  High-velocity projectiles too large to be labeled ‘Ammunition’. 
Chiefly, high explosive shells from 105mm Howitzers. (Sources: 
personal communication with Bill Shaw, 4/16/04) 
 
Incendiaries / white 
phosphorus 
Napalm fire bombs and white phosphorus smoke bombs (<5%).  Total 
fire bomb weights range from 250lb to 750lb, containing between 33-
100 gallons of combustible napalm gel. Napalm was primarily 
successful as a wide-area anti-personnel weapon: “Most effective 
against entrenched infantry, napalm gave off no lethal fragments and 
could be used close to friendly forces without the dangers of 
fragmentation posed by conventional bombs. Often the fire from 
napalm would penetrate jungle that was immune to shrapnel. A single 
napalm canister spread its contents over an area a hundred yards long.” 
(Doleman 1984: 127) 
 
Land mines  Primarily air-dropped ‘Destructor’ mines.  “Destructor Mines are 
general purpose low-drag [GP] bombs converted to mines. They can 
be deployed by air, either at sea as bottom mines or on land as land 
mines. … When dropped on land, they bury themselves in the ground 
on impact, ready to be actuated by military equipment, motor vehicles 
and personnel. When dropped in rivers, canals, channels, and harbors, 
they lie on the bottom ready to be actuated by a variety of vessels 
including war ships, freighters, coastal ships, and small craft.” (FAS 
2004) With just over 55,000 mines listed for the entire country in our 
dataset, compared with an outside estimate of 3,500,000 mines 
(UNMAS 2004), our data capture a trivial fraction of total presumed 
landmine presence in Vietnam. This is  likely because a large share of 
landmines were placed in the ground by U.S. army troops. 
 
Ammunition (000’s of rounds)  Projectiles fired from air at high-velocity.  Cross-sectional diameter 
(caliber) ranges from 5.56mm to 40mm, spanning the traditional 
categories of small-arms (≤0.50 caliber/inches = 12.7 mm), regular 
ammunition, and cannon artillery (≥20mm). (Sources: FAS (2004); 
personal communication with Bill Shaw, 4/16/04) 
 
   
 
 
(2) Vietnam Poverty, Geographic, and Climatic Data 
 District-level estimates of poverty were provided by Nicholas Minot of the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI).  The estimates were generated through poverty mapping, an application of the 
small-area estimation method developed in Elbers et al (2003). This method matches detailed, small-
sample survey data to less-detailed, large-sample census data across geographic units, to generate area-
level estimates of an individual- or household-level phenomenon—in our case, district-level poverty 
incidence in Vietnam.  For more detailed information, see Minot et al. (2003). 
 
The two datasets used by Minot et al. (2003) are the 1997/8 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) 
and a 33% subsample (5,553,811 households) of the 1999 Population and Housing Census.  The VLSS, 
undertaken by the Vietnam General Statistical Office (GSO) in Hanoi with technical assistance from the 
World Bank, is a detailed household-level survey of 4270 rural and 1730 urban Vietnamese households. 
The 1999 Population and Housing Census was conducted by the GSO with technical support from the   46
United Nations Family Planning Agency and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). We also 
use data from the 1992/3 and 2002 VLSS survey rounds in this paper. 
 
Minot et al. use the VLSS data to estimate a household-level, log-linear regression of real cost-of-living-
adjusted per capita consumption expenditure on 17 household characteristics common to both the VLSS 
and the Population and Housing Census. These characteristics include: household size, proportion over 60 
years old, proportion under 15 years old, proportion female, highest level of education completed by head 
of household, whether or not head has a spouse, highest level of education completed by spouse, whether 
or not head is an ethnic minority, occupation of head over last 12 months, type of house (permanent; 
semi-permanent or wooden frame; “simple”), house type interacted with living area, whether or not 
household has electricity, main source of drinking water, type of toilet, whether or not household owns a 
television, whether or not household owns a radio, and region. Minot et al. (2003) partition the sample to 
undertake separate parameter estimates for the correlates of rural and urban poverty.  
 
Predicted consumption expenditures per capita for each of the district-coded households in the 1999 
Population and Housing Census sample are then generated using the parameter estimates from these 
regressions.  Properly weighting by the size of each household, this enables Minot et al (2003) to generate 
an estimate of district-level poverty incidence, the percentage of the population in each district that lives 
below the official national poverty line of 1,789,871 Vietnam Dong (VND) per person per year (GSO 
2000).  
 
All district-level topographic, geographic, and climatic data used in this paper were provided by Nicholas 
Minot and are identical to those used in Minot et al. (2003). The topographical data used in Minot et al. 
(2003) are taken from the United States Geological Survey. 
 
Province population figures in the 1980s and 1990s are from the Vietnam Statistical Yearbooks (Vietnam 
General Statistical Office). Unfortunately, we have been unable to locate complete and consistently 
defined province level demographic data from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s. These Yearbooks 
also contain information on total state investment flows by province from 1976-1985, data that is also 
used in the statistical analysis. 
 
(3) Data from the pre-“American War” period 
Pre-war, province-level demographic data on South Vietnam were taken from the 1959-1965 editions of 
the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam, published by the National Institute of Statistics in Saigon, and for 
North Vietnam from the Vietnam Agricultural Statistics over 35 Years (1956-1990), published by the 
GSO Statistical Publishing House in Hanoi (1991). Province level agricultural statistics are also available 
(e.g., rice paddy yields), but it is widely thought that such prewar data are unreliable as a result of the 
prewar ideological conflict between North and South Vietnam (Banens 1999), and thus we do not use 
those data in the analysis. 
 
A final data source we considered is the HAMLA/HES database collected by the U.S. government 
starting in South Vietnam in 1967-68 (described in Kalyvas and Kocher 2003), which collected rough 
proxies for village socioeconomic conditions. The two main drawbacks of this data is that first, the exact 
procedure for assigning the local SES measures is not transparent or well-described in existing sources, 
and second the data was collected several years into the war, and thus may be endogenous to earlier U.S. 
bombing patterns. For these reasons we do not utilize this data in the empirical analysis. 